Determinants of the recent growth surge in Africa: what changed since mid-1990s? by EZZAHIDI, Elhadj & El Alaoui, Aicha
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Determinants of the recent growth surge
in Africa: what changed since mid-1990s?
Elhadj EZZAHIDI and Aicha El Alaoui
November 2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/67792/
MPRA Paper No. 67792, posted 11. November 2015 17:58 UTC
1Determinants of the recent growth surge in Africa: what changed
since mid-1990s?
El Hadj EZZAHID
Mohammed V University
Faculty of Law and Economics
Rabat-Morocco
e-mail: ezzahidelhadj@yahoo.fr
Aïcha EL ALAOUI
Sultan My Slimane University
Polydisciplinary Faculty
Beni Mellal-Morocco
e-mail: r.aicha05@gmail.com
November 2015
Abstract
Growth performance of African countries since their independence in the
late 1950s until mid-1990s is qualified by many scholars as a tragedy.
Geography, ethnic fractionalization, conflicts and wars, bad policies, predatory
elites, and many other phenomena were the factors presumed to explain the poor
or catastrophic growth performance of the bulk of African countries.
Fortunately, a revival of the economic growth in the majority of African
countries is observed since mid-1990s. Identification of the factors that are
instrumental of this growth’s surge is of prime importance for policy makers. It
is so because growth is the condition, even not sufficient one, to poverty
reduction and improvement of standards of life in Africa. In spite of the
structural differences between African countries, many factors affect their
economies in the same manner. One major result of our paper is that contrary to
what is the common belief in the 1970s, 1980s and the first half of the 1990s,
investment was positively linked to growth in African countries in the period
2000-2009.
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21. Introduction
Since the end of the 1950s and the independence of its countries, Africa as
a whole underwent a major disillusion. During the first half of the 20th century,
Africa outperformed 1 Asia (Collier and Gunning, 1999). Compared to its
performance in the first half of the 20th century, the growth performance
improved in African countries in the period 1960-1973. "In 1970, the real per
capita GDP was 30% higher in SSA 2 excluding South Africa compared to
Southeast Asia" (Stein, 2008, p. 1). This picture changed dramatically in the
period from 1973 to mid-1990s due especially to terms of trade shocks, conflicts
and political instability, and reinforcement of the dictatorships among others.
Growth in Africa deteriorated if we compare the continent with its past
performance or the performance of Asia’s countries since mid-1970s. Therefore,
over the period spanning from 1970s until mid-1990s "Africa’s economies first
flattered and then started to decline" (Collier and Gunning, 1999, p. 3).
This pattern continues until mid-1990s. Since then, a new cycle has
emerged. Indeed, since "mid-1990s, average African growth accelerated"
(Collier and Gunning, 1999, p. 19). This growth recovery created hopes for a
brighter Africa’s future compared to the past. Many scholars and institutions
share this feeling 3 (Broadberry and Gardner, 2013; The Economist, 2011;
Rodrik, 2014). There are available indirect indices that the prosperity of
Africans, measured by real consumption derived from the consumed basket of
goods and services and the quality of life, performed well since mid-1990
(Young, 2012)4.
1
"In the 1960s, most African countries were richer than their Asian counterparts, and their
stronger natural resource base led many to believe that Africa’s economic potential was
superior to overpopulated Asia’s" (Babatunde, 2012, p. 143). This was also the conviction of
G. Myrdal (1968).
2 SSA is Sub-Saharan African.
3 The Economist published two optimistic special reports on Africa. The first is entitled
"Africa rising" published December 3, 2011. The second is entitled "Aspiring Africa"
published March 2, 2013. Compare these two reports with its report "The hopeless
continent" published Mai 13, 2000.
4
"Demographic and Health Survey data on the consumption of consumer durables and
housing, children's health and mortality, the schooling of youth and the allocation of
women's time between marriage and childbirth and market activity, indicate that since 1990
real material consumption in sub-Saharan Africa has been rising at a rate three and half to
four times that recorded by international data sources such as the PWT and UN, and on par
with the growth taking place in other regions of the world" (Young, 2012, p. 42). PWT and
UN mean the Penn World Tables and the United Nations respectively.
3Researchers were unable to agree on the reasons explaining the
mediocre/poor growth performance of African countries in the post-
independence era over the period 1974 to 1995. Many factors are candidate to
explain this situation. Geography, ethnic fractionalization, poor endowment,
predatory elites, and bad public policies in the areas of physical and human
capital accumulation were the main proposed explanations of the insufficiency
of African growth.
Over the period spanning from 1965 to 1990, growth rate of the real per
capita GDP in many African countries was nil or worse negative (Easterly and
Levine, 1997). Table 1 gives an idea about growth rates of the real GDP and of
real per capita GDP of Africa and other regions. This table shows that over the
period 1980-2009 the GDP’s average growth rate of African countries is higher
than that of the World and practically equal to the growth rate of the MENA
region. The highest real GDP’s growth rates are recorded in China and in Asia-
developing countries. Over the same period, growth rate of the real per capita
GDP in Africa is lower than that of the World’s average. The highest real per
capita GDP growth rate was recorded in China and in Asia’s developing
countries.
As depicted in Figure 1, three phases are distinguishable in the growth’s
evolution of the real per capita GDP (constant 2005 US dollars) in Africa:
growth during 1960-1975, decline during 1976-1995, and recovery during 1996-
2013. There was a continuous divergence between the World’s real GDP per
capita and Africa’s during all periods and between China’s real per capita GDP
and Africa’s during the 20 last years. Remark that, the real per capita GDP in
Africa was higher than that of China over the period 1960-1995 (figure 1).
Table 1. Average growth rates of real GDP and of real per capita GDP
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 1980-2009
g%(1) gy%(2) g% gy% g% gy% g% gy%
Africa 2.94 0.10 3.34 0.91 4.83 2.37 3.74 1.17
World 3.07 1.29 2.67 1.15 2.61 1.37 2.78 1.27
MENA (3) -All Countries 1.20 -1.87 4.22 1.96 4.95 2.88 3.45 0.99
ESP (4) -All Countries 5.08 3.46 3.47 2.21 3.82 3.01 4.12 2.89
ESP-Developing Countries 7.91 6.15 7.96 6.57 8.79 7.89 8.22 6.87
China 10.09 8.52 9.64 8.41 10.21 9.54 9.98 8.83
South Africa 2.24 -0.26 1.39 -0.80 3.66 2.04 2.43 0.33
Source: Calculated using WDI, 2015. (1) g is growth rate of the real GDP (2005 US dollars). (2) gy is
growth rate of the real per capita GDP [per capita GDP=GDP (constant 2005 US$)/total population].
(3) MENA is Middle East and North Africa. (4) ESP is East Asia and Pacific.
4This paper searches to explore the stylized facts characterizing the recent
growth surge in Africa. The objective is, therefore, to identify the regularities
and the indices that may best inform us about the main growth drivers or
constraints in Africa. Mainly, this paper focuses on ten sets of growth factors
(Table 2, annex).
Analysis in this paper focuses on the period 1980-2009 broken into three
sub-periods 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2009. However, the simulated
model in this paper is estimated only for the last sub-period because the data are
available, for the bulk of African countries, only in this sub-period.
Figure 1. Real per capita GDP (constant 2005 US$)- 1960-2013
Source: Elaborated using WDI data set, 2015.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The second section reviews a
sample of literature that focus on the determinants of growth in African
countries over the post-independence era. The third section is a description of
the economic growth experience of African countries. The fourth section is
devoted to present and discuss some econometric results. The fifth section
serves to conclude.
2. Growth in Africa: from the tragedy to the odyssey
There is a growing literature exploring factors behind Africa’s tragic
growth performance since the independence of the bulk of its countries in the
1950s and especially in the period 1975-1995. The available literature focused,
in its first wave in the late 1990s, on the factors behind Africa’s growth tragedy
over the period spanning from mid-1970s to mid-1990s. The second wave of
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5literature explored the drivers/triggers of Africa’s growth revival since mid-
1990s. Here we summarize a sample of empirical research about the growth
experience of Africa.
Easterly and Levine (1997) attempted to understand how no economic
variables, such as ethnic fractionalization, command economic performance
directly and indirectly through their impact on the nature and quality of public
policies. The two authors used averaged data for the periods 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s. They documented that standard growth factors such as "low school
attainment, political instability, poorly developed financial systems, large black
market exchange rate premiums, large government deficits, and inadequate
infrastructure… account for about two-fifths of the growth differential between
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and fast-growing East Asia" (Easterly and
Levine, 1997, p. 1205). The authors focused on how ethnic fractionalization is
related to bad policies presumed to be the main element that hinder the
accumulation of factors and be at the origin of the growth gap in Sub-Saharan
Africa compared to East Asia. For the authors, ethnic diversity is associated to
bad public policies and hence is strongly, albeit indirectly, linked to growth
performance in Sub-Saharan countries.
Bloom and Sachs (1998) explored the factors that are at the root of the
long-run growth decline in African countries. They showed that "African per
capita income growth averaged 1.5 percent in the 1960s, 0.8 percent in the
1970s, and -1.2 percent in 1980s. Output per capita continued to decline from
1990 to 1996 at a rate of 0.9 percent per year" (Bloom and Sachs, 1998, p. 208).
They invoked six sets of factors to explain Africa’s catastrophic economic
performance: external conditions, heavy dependence on a small number of
primary exports, internal politics, economic policies, demographic change, and
social conditions. The authors concluded that Africa’s poor growth is mainly
due to its geography and demography.
In its review of the literature that answered the question: why has Africa
grown slowly?, Collier and Gunning (1999) distinguish four classes of factors.
These four classes are: (1) domestic exogenous factors such as geography and
soil’s quality, (2) domestic policies, politics, and institutions such as political
freedom and bureaucracy, (3) external exogenous factors such as volatility of
terms of trade and accessibility of foreign markets, and (4) external policies such
as exchange rate and trade policies (Collier and Gunning, 1999, table 2, p. 7).
6According to these authors, "the binding constraint upon Africa’s growth may
have been externally oriented policies in the past" (Collier and Gunning, 1999,
p. 20).
The earlier papers, that explored the determinants of growth with data
about African economies, found that being an African country is frequently
associated with low growth performance (Barro, 1991 and Mauro, 1995).
Englebert (2000) undertook a thorough exploration "which purports to solve the
mystery of the AFRICA dummy" (p. 1822). His main hypothesis is that the lack
of legitimacy of many post-independence African states constraints elites to
adopt policies "which retard or hinder growth" (p. 1822). He constructed an
index to discriminate between legitimate and non-legitimate countries. " 'State
legitimacy' is quantified with a variable that differentiates endogenous from
imported statehood with the idea that political institutions which evolve
endogenously into a society, as a result of domestic social interactions or in
opposition to neighbouring societies, are presumed historically legitimate from a
societal point of view. This dummy variable takes the value 1 when a state is
historically legitimate, 0 otherwise" (p. 1827). He concluded that the real
impediments of growth in Africa countries are rooted in its polity. Furthermore,
when the measure of the legitimacy of the state is introduced, the Africa’s
dummy ceased to be significant.
Using an augmented Solow model, Hoeffler (2002) searched to explain
the African growth experience. The author’s objective is to examine the validity
of the conclusion of authors such as Barro (1991) and Levine and Renelt (1992)
who found that an Africa dummy is negatively and significantly linked to
growth in African countries. Using a generalized method of moments (GMM)
estimator, Hoeffler reported "that there is no systematic unobserved difference
between African and non-African countries. Hence, rather than concentrating
research efforts on the analysis of a spurious Africa dummy, it may be more
worthwhile to focus on the continent’s low investment ratios and high
population growth rates, which we found to be sufficient to explain Africa’s low
growth rates" (Hoeffler, 2002, p. 156).
Knutsen (2009) analysed the links between democratization and growth
performance in Sub-Saharan Africa. The author focused on the negative
economic impact of dictatorial regimes when they operate in an environment
7characterized by weak state institutions. "The empirical analysis shows that
democracy most likely contributes to higher growth rates in Sub-Saharan Africa,
and that democracy has a larger positive effect on growth in Africa than
globally. Moreover, statistical analyses, both on African and global samples,
show that democracy has a particularly positive effect in countries with weak
state institutions" (Knutsen, 2009, p. 1). This author found that ethnic
fractionalization is negatively correlated with growth as in Easterly and Levine
(1997). Contrary to what the convergence hypothesis predicts, it appears that
growth is positively linked to initial level of income in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Regressions show that the largeness of a country and its political stability are
positively linked to its growth.
Diop, Dufrénot and Sanon (2010) explored the links between governance
and institutional characteristics of ECOWAS5 countries and their growth rate of
per capita GDP/income during the period 1995-2004. As we signalled in the
introduction, this period is important because in the mid-1990s, Africa’s growth
recovered from its long-run decline since mid-1970s. For this, they test β-
convergence6 using a panel data model. The set of growth rate determinants
includes the quality of governance and institutions and a bundle of usual
variables for control. The data are annual and cover the period 1995-2004.
Authors’ results show negative relationship "between the growth rate of per
capita GDP and variables reflecting the rule of law, government effectiveness,
property rights, accountability, regulatory burden" (Diop et al., 2010, p. 272).
Mckinsey Global Institute (2010) prepared a report entitled "Lions on the
move: the progress and potential of African economies" in order to explore the
causes of the surge of growth since late 1990s. In this report, it appears that the
surge of growth is not dependant on commodities price boom over the period
2000-2008. The factors that are the real causes of the recovery of growth in
African economies are better investment climate, prudent macroeconomic
policies, and less political conflicts in many countries. The report identified
three undergoing trends that are contributing to sustain growth in African
5 ECOWAS countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.
6 This concept is referred to, among others, Barro (1984), Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1991, 1992). Beta-convergence or "regression toward the mean" occurs when "a
poor economy tends to grow faster than a rich one, so that the poor country tends to catch up
to the rich one in terms of levels of per capita income" (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003, p.
462).
8countries. They are "Africa’s evolving global economic ties, its growing access
to international capital, and the emergence of an urban African consumer" (p.
14).
Tsangarides (2012) focused on factors that are most likely to sustain or
end a growth spell in African economies. He used, as an investigation tool, the
Bayesian Model Averaging techniques/methods for proportional hazards
models. Growth spells are "sustained growth episodes between growth
accelerations and decelerations" (Tsangarides, 2012, p. 1). The author’s
objective is to link "the probability that growth spells will end to the various
determinants including exogenous shocks, human capital, macroeconomic and
socio-political factors" (Tsangarides, 2012, p. 16). By this, the author searched
to isolate the factors that are most likely to contribute to the end of a growth
spell. The point of his exercise is to determine the correlates of growth
spells/surges and ends. Operationally, the author adopted the same definition of
Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer (BOZ, 2012) of a growth spell. Indeed, complete
growth spells are "period of time that (i) begin with a growth up-break followed
by a period of at least a 2 percent average per capita income growth; and (ii) end
with a growth down-break followed by a period of less than 2 percent average
per capita income growth" (Tsangarides, 2012, p. 7). The authors’ main results
are that investment in human and physical capital, trade and openness, and
droughts are the major variables that influence growth surges in Africa
(Tsangarides, 2012, p. 16).
Working on a sample of 19 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries
representing 72% of SSA population and using a data set covering the period
1960-2000, Fosu (2013) explored the links of a healthy political regime with
growth, total factor productivity (TFP), and factor accumulation. As a
fundamental concept 7 , the author used "policy syndromes" that are: "‘state
control’, ‘adverse redistribution’, ‘suboptimal inter-temporal resource
allocation’, and ‘state breakdown’, with the absence of the above syndromes
referred to as ‘syndrome-free’" (Fosu, 2013, p. 4). The main patterns of growth
of the region show that "per capita growth rate moves rather well with TFP
growth, compared with its movement with either physical or human capital
7 Fosu (2013) paper refers strongly to the African Economic Research Consortium growth
project. This project assumes that "policy syndromes" are strongly linked to the mediocre
growth experience of African countries especially in the 1970s, 1980s, and the first half of
the 1990s.
9accumulation. The contribution of education seems particularly uniform over
time and seems unrelated to the evolution of growth" (Fosu, 2013, p. 3).
Mijiyawa (2013) focused on the period 1995-2005. During this period, a
revival of growth in Africa was observed. A Mijiyawa conducted multivariate
growth regressions à la Barro and found that physical capital accumulation,
volume of credit issued to the private sector, effectiveness of the government,
extent of exports, and share of manufacturing activities in GDP are linked
significantly and positively to growth. The author conducted a robustness check
of his results by introducing measures of ethnic and language diversity, a
dummy to take account of the non-access to the sea of a country, and an index
measuring the extent of the tropical climate in a country. The author
documented no change of the sign and significance of the five variables that he
initially detected to be growth enhancing factors (Mijiyawa, 2013, p. 9).
M. Ghazanchyan and J. Stotsky (2013) explored the determinants of the
growth surge over the period 1999-2011 for a sample of 42 Sub-Saharan African
countries. The authors use cross-section and time series data and employ
different econometric techniques. The main results of the authors are that "the
recent African growth experience has been varied and that capital accumulation
has boosted growth but that the relationship is not as strong or clear as might be
expected. Evidence for the positive effect of the private investment is largely
limited to oil exporters, where its main impulse may be on the demand side.
Some evidence is found for a positive effect of public investment in the non-oil
countries... Some limited evidence is found for a positive impact of more
flexible foreign exchange regimes. The change in the real effective exchange
rate and current account liberalization do not appear to be strong determinants of
growth or their effect does not clearly emerge at this aggregate level of data" (p.
20).
3. Descriptive patterns of growth in Africa
Growth rates in Africa deteriorated sharply in the 1970s and in the 1980s.
Fortunately, since mid-1990s a slight improvement of Africa’s growth rate is
observed, but not as bright as what is observed in Asian countries. In the first
decade of the millennium, a more robust recovery started pushing many
observers to consider that Africa is in the onset of an era of sustainable high
10
growth. Table 3 reports the growth performances of Africa over the sub-periods
1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009.
Table 3. Overall average growth rates in Africa, in %
1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 1980-2009
Average growth rate of g 2.94 3.34 4.83 3.74
Standard deviation of g 5.84 11.76 6.26 8.45
Maximum of g 23.60 149.97(1) 63.38(1) 149.97
Minimum of g -26.67 -51.03(2) -32.83 -51.03
Source: WDI, 2015. (1) These rates were recorded in Equatorial Guinea. (2) This rate was recorded in
Liberia.
The mean of a set of numerical magnitudes is commonly used to resume
their statistical distribution. In reality, the mean is a good measure of the central
tendency only in symmetrical concentrated distributions. In our paper, it is not
the case because the growth rates of African countries are neither symmetrical
nor concentrated around their mean. Table 4 provides the distribution of the
average growth rate of African countries over the sub-periods 1980-1989, 1990-
1999, 2000-2009, and 1980-2009 over 5 modalities. The fifth modality includes
countries for which data is not available.
Table 4 shows that (1) the bulk of countries recorded an average growth
rate between 0% and 5% over the period 1980-2009; (2) among these countries
recording a growth rate between 0 and 5%, a kernel of 18 countries recorded
systematically a growth rate in this range (i.e. [0, 5[) during the three sub-
periods. These countries are Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Comoros, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa and Togo.
They represent 34.6% of Africa countries; (3) the cases of Zimbabwe and
Equatorial Guinea are particular. Zimbabwe is the only country that recorded a
negative growth rate during sub-period 2000-2009. Its growth rate is on a
continuous degradation from class [5, 10[ during the first sub-period down to
class [0, 5[ during the second sub-period, and down to class [-5, 0[ during the
last sub-period. In contrast, Equatorial Guinea recorded the highest growth rate
during the sub-periods 1990-1999 and 2000-2009. Its growth rate jumped from
class [0, 5[ during the first sub-period to class [10, +[ during second and third
sub-periods.
11
Table 4. Distribution of countries according to the average growth rate of their real GDP
Classes 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 1980-2009
ni fi (%) ni fi(%) ni fi(%) ni fi(%)
[-05, 00[ 3 6 6 12 1 2 1 2
[00, 05[ 37 71 34 65 31 59 41 79
[05, 10[ 6 11 7 13 16 31 9 17
[10, +[ 1 2 2 4 3 6 1 2
NA* 5 10 3 6 1 2 0 0
Total of  Countries 52 100 52 100 52 100 52 100
Source: our elaboration, * No Available data
4. Methodology and results
Many factors could be attributed a positive or a negative role in economic
growth. Furthermore, we can distinguish between large and marginal effects
factors. We can classify growth factors into broad families. Our objective in this
paper is to explain the average growth performance of African countries by a
bundle of factors that are most likely to explain their growth performance and,
therefore, to detect the most relevant variables in the process of growth in these
economies during the period 2000-2009. We introduce the factors that empirical
literature on growth revealed to be the most important. We will run the
following equation8:
gi = β0 + β1YIC + β2X1…+ βkXk + εi = βX + ε
Here X1, X2…Xk are explanatory variables and YIC is the initial real per
capita income introduced to take account of the convergence hypothesis. Table 5
in annex presents definitions, notation, and broad families of these variables.
The vector of parameters is β. The econometric study is devised so as to explore
multiple specifications of the growth rate function.
Growth depends on numerous factors. It is possible to enumerate a half
hundreds of factors9 that are likely to explain growth performance of a country.
In this paper, we want to explore the most influential factors commanding
growth in Africa. Indeed, as proposed by the proponents of the growth
diagnostic approach (Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco, 2005), it is an interesting
and fruitful methodology to identify primarily the most binding obstacles in
Africa. Remark also that a factor Xi may be linked to growth directly or
8 We also run an equation with the real per capita GDP as endogenous variable.
9 We can distinguish factors depending on being triggers, or enablers, or supporters, or
engines, or hinderers, or boosters, or stimulators. Another classification may separate
contributing factors and mediating factors. One of the most used classifications is proximate
vs. fundamental or root factors of growth.
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indirectly. What is important for us is the magnitude of the influence of those
factors on the growth performance of African countries. The consequence of the
use of this methodology is to roll out/exclude factors that impact positively or
negatively but marginally the economy’s growth rate.
It is important to signal that we are aware of the limits of our
methodology. Certainly, running the growth equation 1 to identify the variables
that are at average the most relevant for growth in Africa in a given period is
misleading because of the absence of homogeneity of African economies. In
fact, these economies are heterogeneous, i.e. they do not have the same
production function, they do not adopt the same policies, and they do not
operate under the same structural conditions. The relevance of our results stems
from their usefulness to determine the list of variables that are to take account in
any strategy designed to enhance growth in Africa.
We regress the growth rate of real GDP, noted g, and the growth rate of
real per capita GDP, noted gy, for 48 African countries on different regressors.
Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and ‘Sao Tome and Principe’ are excluded
because their data are not available. Only results of 9 regressions are presented
in annex (Table 6 and Table 7). For both models, we keep the same exogenous
variables to allow comparison. Table 6 presents results of simulating equation 1
where the growth rate of real GDP, noted g, is the endogenous variable. Table 7
provides results of simulating equation 1 with the growth rate of real per capita
GDP, noted gy, as the endogenous variable. Table 8 and Table 9 (in Annex)
provide results of equation 1 after excluding Botswana from our 48 countries
sample. The idea behind this is to compare our results with the results of
Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack (2001).
In all models presented in annex (Table 6 and Table 7), we observe that
the set of explanatory variables that have the expected sign remains unchanged.
We can highlight four of our results. The first result is that investment and
governance and institutional variables are linked positively, albeit sometimes
insignificantly, to growth in Africa. This result is similar to result of M.
Ghazanchyan and J. Stotsky (2013). Recall also that A. Mijiyawa (2003)
introduced, among others, similar exogenous factors in his study of the Africa’s
drivers of growth over the period 1995-2005. He found that the measure
physical capital accumulation and the measure of the effectiveness of
13
government are linked significantly and positively to growth. Our results
concord with Mijiyawa’s only in the case of investment rate.
The second result is that the real interest rate (r) affects negatively and
systematically growth in Africa. This result is concordant with the results of
authors mentioned above who observed that the price of capital goods in terms
of the price of consumption goods is higher in African countries. Indeed, Artadi
and Sala-i-Martin (2003) recorded evidence on how higher is the price of capital
goods in Africa (p. 10 and figure 13).
The third result is the positive impact of most variables measuring
institutional capital on economic growth especially the positive and significant
coefficient attached to regulatory quality variable (ICR). This result is so
important in the African context. Indeed, what African countries need is
primarily a sound and healthy environment or climate of investment and the
human and institutional capabilities to implement reforms.
The fourth result is the robustness, the positivity, and the significance of
the coefficient attached to the investment rate in the models of the growth rate of
the real GDP and the growth rate of the real per capita GDP. This result deserves
deep investigation because sound research proved that during the pre-growth
revival in Africa, investment in Africa is not low but inefficient (Devarajan et
al., 2001). Indeed, Devarajan et al. (2001) widely documented that over the
period 1970-1997 the African economies suffered more from a low return of
investment than from a low investment per se. The authors were aware of the
fact that African countries invest a lower rate of their GDP but convincingly
argue that this may be a rational response of economic agents to the low return
of investment. The main argument of the authors is that private and public
investments are loosely linked to growth when Botswana is excluded from their
sample. They found that "... a combination of factors, all of which occurred
simultaneously" (p. 23) may explain the weak impact of investment on growth
in Africa. They concluded that "the solution lies in addressing this set of factors
simultaneously" (p. 23). We think that their result ceased to be valid since mid-
1995. Indeed, we check the robustness of this result by excluding Botswana, as
do Devarajan and al. (2001), from our sample (Table 8 and Table 9).
Investment is necessary for growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992). It is more
central for African countries that are in the first stages of economic development
14
based on the accumulation of physical capital such as bridges, roads, ports, and
schools. Contrary to Devarajan et al. (2001), we think that many factors, that in
the 1970s, the 1980s, and the first half of the 1990s prevented investment from
producing its full effects on growth, were removed since mid-1990s as
evidenced by the strong links that we find between investment and growth in the
period 2000-2009 (Tables 6, 7, 8, and 9 in annex). This observation is also
shared by Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003) who asserted that private investment
recorded a growing trend in Africa during the 1990s and this "may be one of the
reasons behind the slight increase in growth rates of the second half of the
decade and the first two years of the new century" (p. 9).
5. Concluding remarks
Research on episodes of economic growth surges and declines (outbreaks
and down-breaks) show that the sources of an increase of the rate of growth in a
country are not the same factors that cause a reversal (Tsangarides, 2012). For
African countries, known by their fragility and by the no-durability of growth
rather than by the absence of periods of high growth rates, it is necessary to take
account of factors that initiate growth, of factors that sustain growth, and those
factors that stop growth. This warning is so important because in many
situations we have observed dramatic and sudden reversals of growth periods
due to wars, political instability, or unwise economic policies. The objective of
African policy-makers must be to make the current growth surge in Africa
persistent and a real and lasting take-off rather than a one-time event.
Many authors interested to the causes of the tragedy of growth in Africa
proposed that the nature and quality of institutions are at the root of this tragedy
(Englebert, 2001). Later research corroborated this conjecture. In accordance
with development economics literature, that digs deeper into the fundamental
determinants of growth and development, it appears that African economies
suffered and continue to suffer from the low quality of institutions that translates
into bad governance, produces inefficient policies, and contributes to the design
of reverse incentives.
The survey and inspection of post-independence growth experience of
African countries provide useful results about triggers, impediments, and
trajectory of growth in this so diverse continent. It appears that African countries
inefficiency and lacks of proximate factors of growth are due to the absence of
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deep growth factors that may provide adequate incentives to accumulate and use
resources efficiently. These deep factors are institutions that shape incentives,
decisions, and policies (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). In Africa, it is widely
accepted that lack of adequate institutions is the ultimate explanation of Sub-
Saharan African countries low growth performance. The creation and making of
the post-independence state shaped its legitimacy and thus the policies that its
rulers adopted. The future research on the development shortfalls in Africa
should concentrate on the factors that shape institutions, determines state
legitimacy and elites’ incentives as proposed by authors such as D. Acemoglu
and J. Robinson (2012).
Current growth prospects in Africa are brilliant. The continent may
improve its performance by accumulating physical and human capital,
(re)allocating inputs to the most productive uses, increasing efficiency through
imitating best practices in productive activities and public sector decision-
making. Physical accumulation of capital may be a promising road in Africa
because econometric results provide evidence that investment is positively
linked to growth.
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Table 2. Classification of growth factors
Growth Factors
Taxonomy
Variable 1 Variable 2 Variable 3 Variable 4 Variable 5
1. Tangible
reproducibl
e Capital
Rate of
investment
K/Y Physical
infrastructure
availability
2. Human
Capital
Average
number of
years of
schooling
secondary school
enrolment rate
Life expectancy at
birth
3. Governanc
e and
Institutional
capital
Index of
democracy
Index of
corruption
Quality of
bureaucracy
Rule of law
(Bolt)
4. Social
capital
Index of
social
confidence
Crimes frequency Ethnic heterogeneity
5. Macroecon
omic
management
Inflation Government
deficit
Current account
deficit
Public debt
(debt service
in GNI- %)
Black market
exchange
rate premium
6. Sectoral
structure of the
economy
Manufacturi
ng
VAM/GDP
Agricultural
VAA/GDP
Rate of urbanization
7. Openness (M+X)/GDP M/GDP X/GDP
8. Geography
(natural
capital)
Water
availability
Coastal borders Forest density Natural
products as
% of X
9. Financial
Sector
Financial
deepening
Real interest rate
10. Initial
conditions
Real per
capita GDP
in the
beginning of
the period
Source: Our elaboration
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Table 5. Definitions and notation of the variables
Description Notation Details (unit)(*)
Real GDP Y Total GDP at 2005 $ (number)
Total population N Total of people residing in a country
Real GDP growth rate g Growth rate of the real GDP at 2005US$ (%)
Real per capita GDP growth rate gy Growth rate of the real GDP per capita at 2005US$ (%)
Tangible reproducible Capital 1 Inv Rate of investment is the ratio of gross capital formation plus the net
change in the level of inventories to GDP (%)
Tangible reproducible Capital 2 roads Availability of roads is the share of paved roads in percent in total roads
(%)
Human capital 1 hcp Primary completion rate (%)
Human capital 2 hcs Secondary enrolment rate (%)
Human capital 3 hclife Life expectancy at birth: the number of years a new born is expected to
live, (number)
Human capital 4 hclt Literacy rate of adult total (% of people ages 15 and above)
Governance and Institutional
capital 1
icv Voice and Accountability "Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional
or violent means, including politically motivated violence and
terrorism".
Governance and Institutional
capital 2
icr Regulatory Quality "Reflects perceptions of the ability of the
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations
that permit and promote private sector development".
Governance and Institutional
capital 3
icp Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism "Reflects
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism".
Governance and Institutional
capital 4
icg Government Effectiveness is "the quality of public services, the quality
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies".
Governance and Institutional
capital 5
icl Rule of Law is "the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the
likelihood of crime and violence".
Governance and Institutional
capital 6
icc Control of Corruption "Reflects perceptions of the extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and
grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and
private interests".
Macroeconomic management 1 inf The growth rate of GDP’s implicit deflator (GDP at current price/GDP
at constant price, the two variables are at local currency) (%)
Macroeconomic management 2 fdservice Foreign debt service/GNI (%)
Sectoral structure of the economy 1 industry Share of industry in GDP measured by the ratio of industry’s value
added to total GDP (%)
Sectoral structure of the economy 2 agri Share of agriculture in GDP measured by the ratio of agriculture’s
value added to total GDP (%)
Urbanization rate u Share of the population of urban areas in total population (%)
Economic openness 1 openXM (X+M)/ GDP, (%)
Economic openness 2 openX X/GDP, (%)
Economic openness 3 openM M/GDP, (%)
Natural capital (geography) 1 ncf Forest density % is = Forest Area/total area
Natural capital (geography) 2 ncw Water availability (% of population with access to water services)
Natural capital (geography) 3 ncrent Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)
Financial Sector 1 r Real interest rate
Financial Sector 2 DCPS Financial sector deepening measured by domestic credit to the private
sector/GDP (%)
Terms of trade Terms Relative price of African countries exportation to the price of their
imported products (%)
(*) Source of all variables is the WDI, 2015 excluding the variables that measure governance and institutional
capital, their source is the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2014. The WGI which is one of the most carefully
constructed and most widely used indicator (Maurseth, 2008) aims at aggregating existing sources about
governance to construct new and more reliable composite indicators. It shows the estimated governance scores
ranging between approximately -2.5 and 2.5 and the percentile rank of ranging from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest)
ranks. The six aggregate indicators are based on 30 underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of
governance of a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments worldwide and they cover a wide
range of countries.
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Table 6. Growth rate of real GDP (g) is the endogenous variable, sub-period 2000-2009 and 48
Africa’s countries
Notation Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 3 Mod. 4 Mod. 5 Mod. 6 Mod. 7 Mod. 8 Mod. 9
constant -1.04 0.62 1.01 1.24 1.73 7.69 3.76 0.40 2.50
t-stat -0.80 0.32 0.46 0.33 0.44 1.64 0.95 0.08 0.74
1. Initial condition y2000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004
t-stat -0.66 -0.82 -0.91 -0.39 -0.51 -1.26 -1.02 -1.27 -1.21
2. Tangible capital
inv
t-stat
0.17 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.09
4.39 1.87 1.67 1.85 1.64 0.75 1.32 1.45
roads
t-stat
0.02 0.01 0.01
0.65 0.39 0.53
3. Human capital
hcp
t-stat
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.73 0.62 0.34 0.31 0.42
hcs
t-stat
0.01 0.01
0.18 0.17
hclife
t-stat
0.01
0.10
hclt
t-stat
-0.04 -0.04
-1.18 -1.14
4. institutional
capital
icp
t-stat
-0.38
-0.44
icg
t-stat
0.61 1.17
0.48 0.59
icl
t-stat
0.34 0.47
0.43 0.52
icc
t-stat
1.15
0.76
icv
t-stat
1.61 0.55
1.70 0.31
icr
t-stat
1.85
2.20
5. Macroeconomic
stability
inf
t-stat
0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.002 0.006
0.38 -0.06 -0.06 0.32 0.31 0.02 0.07
fdservicv
t-stat
0.22 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.25
2.14 2.15 2.03 2.01 2.12 1.78
6. Sectotial
structure
industry
t-stat
0.02 0.02 0.01 0.001 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04
0.70 0.69 0.11 0.02 -0.81 -0.72 -0.58
agri
t-stat
0.002 0.003 -0.031 0.003 0.002 0.003
0.05 0.06 -0.61 0.07 1.37 0.69
u
t-stat
-0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03
-0.79 -0.80 -1.23 -1.07
7. Economic
Openness
openxm
t-stat
-0.003 -0.002 0.02 0.004
-0.19 -0.13 1.21 0.26
openm
t-stat
-0.04 -0.03
-1.07 -0.77
openx
t-stat
0.07 0.07
1.24 1.02
8. natural capital
(Geography)
ncf
t-stat
-0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02
-0.70 -0.65 -1.01 -0.65
ncw
t-stat
-0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02
-0.84 -0.77 -1.43 -0.75
ncrent
t-stat
0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.07
0.37 0.52 0.86 0.72 1.68 1.51
9. Financial Sector
r
t-stat
-0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08
-0.82 -1.18 -1.10 -0.97 -0.90 -1.16 -0.76 -0.99 -1.35
dcps
t-stat
0.01 0.01 0.001
0.42 0.35 0.03
R2 0.37 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.45 0.39 0.23 0.28
Source: Our calculation
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Table 7. Growth of real per capita GDP (gy) is the endogenous variable, sub-period 2000-2009
and 48 Africa’s countries
Notation Mod1 Mod2 Mod3 Mod4 Mod5 Mod6 Mod7 Mod8 Mod9
constant 0.99 5.25 5.52 4.97 5.89 13.00 12.90 3.46 -1.10
t-stat 0.68 2.48 2.35 1.24 1.42 2.70 2.85 0.66 -0.36
1. Initial
conditions
y2000 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0005 -0.0003
t-stat -1.78 -1.15 -1.17 -0.87 -1.08 -1.34 -1.37 -1.50 -0.92
2. Tangible
capital
inv
t-stat
0.19 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.10
4.39 1.63 1.48 1.75 1.47 0.71 0.76 1.63
roads
t-stat
0.02 0.02 0.01
0.68 0.72 0.30
3. Human capital
hcp
t-stat
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
0.28 0.21 0.27 0.23 0.76
hcs
t-stat
0.00 -0.01
-0.12 -0.16
hclife
t-stat
0.004
0.04
hclt
t-stat
-0.05 -0.05
-1.39 -1.36
4. Governance
and institutional
capital
icp
t-stat
-0.79
-0.99
icg
t-stat
0.25 0.23
0.19 0.18
icl
t-stat
0.25 0.88
0.29 0.92
icc
t-stat
1.40
1.00
icv
t-stat
2.14 2.13
2.20 2.24
icr
t-stat
1.85
2.04
5.
Macroeconomic
stability
inf
t-stat
0.08 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.03 -0.034
0.99 0.17 0.18 0.61 0.63 0.35 -0.46
fdservice
t-stat
0.28 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.35 0.35
2.47 2.45 1.85 1.86 2.47 2.52
6. Sectoral
structure of the
economy
industry
t-stat
0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02
0.82 0.82 -0.28 -0.43 -0.91 -0.92 -0.34
agri
t-stat
0.004 0.004 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.02
0.08 0.09 -0.81 -0.83 1.73 0.56
u
t-stat
-0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
-1.20 -1.24 -1.71 -1.75
7. Economic
Openness
openxm
t-stat
-0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01
-0.78 -0.73 0.54 0.85
openm
t-stat
-0.06 -0.06
-1.44 -1.46
openx
t-stat
0.06 0.06
1.05 1.09
8. Geography
(natural capital)
ncf
t-stat
-0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
-0.40 -0.32 -0.89 -0.93
ncw
t-stat
-0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05
-0.94 -0.84 -1.63 -1.66
ncrent
t-stat
0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04
0.95 1.19 1.19 1.21 2.07 1.02
9. Financial
Sector
r
t-stat
-0.05 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06
-0.90 -1.59 -1.51 -1.33 -1.22 -1.73 -1.78 -1.35 -1.09
dcps
t-stat
0.01 0.01 -0.002
0.37 0.27 -0.07
R2 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.54 0.54 0.29 0.22
Source: Our calculation
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Table 8. Growth rate of real GDP (g) is the endogenous variable, sub-period 2000-2009 and 47
Africa’s countries (Botswana excluded)
Notation Mod1 Mod2 Mod3 Mod4 Mod5 Mod6 Mod7 Mod8 Mod9
constant 1.96 6.71 7.64 7.37 8.19 13.90 14.53 13.16 4.83
t-stat 1.48 3.36 3.50 1.84 2.00 3.02 3.22 2.48 1.53
1. Initial
conditions
y2000 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0002
t-stat -2.08 -0.68 -0.97 -0.98 -1.17 -1.54 -1.41 -1.94 -0.56
2. Tangible
capital
inv 0.20 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.12
t-stat 5.17 1.82 1.52 1.77 1.50 1.02 0.96 1.92
roads 0.03 0.02 0.02
t-stat 1.11 0.87 0.82
3. Human capital
hcp -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
t-stat -0.54 -0.73 -0.56 -0.62 -1.49
hcs -0.04 -0.03
t-stat -1.15 -0.90
hclife -0.10
t-stat -1.14
hclt -0.04 -0.04
t-stat -1.40 -1.36
4. Governance
and institutional
capital
icp 0.55
t-stat 0.68
icg -0.08 0.09
t-stat -0.06 0.08
icl 0.84 0.94
t-stat 1.05 0.99
icc -0.94
t-stat -0.65
icv 1.80 1.87
t-stat 1.96 2.06
icr 2.26
t-stat 2.60
5.
Macroeconomic
stability
inf 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.003
t-stat 0.32 -0.36 -0.34 0.11 0.09 -0.39 -0.04
fdservice -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.07
t-stat -0.67 -0.46 -0.17 -0.17 0.47 0.52
6. Sectorial
structure of the
economy
industry 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.07
t-stat 1.57 1.61 0.56 0.45 -0.56 -0.53 1.05
agri -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.001 0.01
t-stat -0.10 -0.06 -0.91 -1.02 -0.03 0.30
u -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03
t-stat -0.63 -0.66 -1.17 -1.09
7. Economic
Openness
openxm -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.01
t-stat -0.21 -0.10 -0.19 -0.87
openm -0.07 -0.07
t-stat -1.78 -1.88
openx 0.10 0.10
t-stat 1.84 1.76
8. Geography
(natural capital)
ncf 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
t-stat 0.21 0.27 -0.24 -0.60
ncw -0.04 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06
t-stat -1.24 -1.10 -2.06 -1.97
ncrent -0.004 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.02
t-stat -0.08 0.20 0.28 0.19 1.52 -0.55
9. Financial
Sector
r -0.12 -0.14 -0.13 -0.17 -0.16 -0.19 -0.19 -0.17 -0.14
t-stat -2.32 -2.79 -2.61 -2.67 -2.52 -3.49 -3.42 -3.15 -2.63
dcps 0.01 0.01 0.02
t-stat 0.61 0.46 0.81
R2 0.48 0.42 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.60 0.59 0.40 0.39
Source: Our calculation
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Table 9. Growth rate of real per capita GDP (gy) is the endogenous variable, sub-period 2000-
2009 and 47 Africa’s countries (Botswana excluded)
Notation Mod1 Mod2 Mod3 Mod4 Mod5 Mod6 Mod7 Mod8 Mod9
constant -0.72 3.80 4.15 2.27 2.62 4.21 4.68 7.05 1.62
t-stat -0.52 1.79 1.77 0.53 0.59 0.79 0.90 1.26 0.49
1. Initial
conditions
y2000 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0003 0.0001
t-stat -0.61 0.44 0.30 0.27 0.17 -0.82 -0.74 -0.90 0.38
2. Tangible
capital
inv 0.16 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08
t-stat 3.86 1.12 0.99 1.23 1.09 1.05 1.02 1.19
roads 0.03 0.02 0.03
t-stat 0.76 0.61 0.94
3. Human capital
hcp -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
t-stat -0.87 -0.92 -1.36 -1.37 -1.60
hcs -0.05 -0.04
t-stat -1.13 -1.02
hclife -0.05 -0.05 -0.09
t-stat -1.40 -1.36 -0.94
hclt
t-stat
4. Governance
and institutional
capital
icp 0.07
t-stat 0.09
icg 1.99 2.12
t-stat 1.39 1.52
icl 0.32 0.40
t-stat 0.37 0.40
icc -0.38
t-stat -0.25
icv -0.46 -0.41
t-stat -0.44 -0.39
icr 1.81
t-stat 1.97
5.
Macroeconomic
stability
inf -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.04
t-stat -0.10 -0.49 -0.48 -0.30 -0.32 -0.77 -0.56
fdservice 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06
t-stat 0.47 0.53 0.56 0.55 0.35 0.39
6. Sectorial
structure of the
economy
industry 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.07 0.05
t-stat 1.22 1.22 0.69 0.63 -0.84 -0.83 0.67
agri 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03
t-stat 0.39 0.40 0.46 0.40 0.78 0.54
u -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03
t-stat -0.59 -0.59 -0.97 -0.93
7. Economic
Openness
openxm -0.0003 0.0003 0.0047 -0.0007
t-stat -0.02 0.02 0.32 -0.05
openm -0.06 -0.06
t-stat -1.46 -1.54
openx 0.13 0.13
t-stat 2.01 1.98
8. Geography
(natural capital)
ncf -0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.003
t-stat -0.05 -0.02 0.10 -0.11
ncw -0.002 -0.001 -0.01 -0.01
t-stat -0.08 -0.03 -0.31 -0.22
ncrent -0.001 0.004 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.01
t-stat -0.03 0.09 0.55 0.50 1.72 -0.12
9. Financial
Sector
r -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04
t-stat -0.49 -0.62 -0.55 -0.59 -0.52 -0.86 -0.78 -0.77
dcps 0.01 0.01 0.02
t-stat 0.29 0.23 0.53
R2 0.30 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.35 0.34 0.19 0.18
Source: Our calculation
